Devan Murugan speaks with Stanlib’s Chief Economist Kevin Lings and unpacks South Africa’s sovereign debt crisis. Courtesy of #DStv403

The current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises does not work: sovereign debt restructurings come too late and do too little. Though they impose enormous costs on societies, these restructurings are often not deep enough to provide the conditions for economic recovery (as illustrated by the Greek debt restructuring of 2012). And if the debtor decides not to accept the terms demanded by the creditors, finalizing a restructuring can be slowed by legal challenges (as evidenced in Argentina).

A fresh start for distressed debtors is a basic principle of a well-functioning market economy, yet there is no international bankruptcy framework for sovereign debts. While this problem is not new, the United Nations and the global community are now willing to do something about it. Providing guidance for those who intend to take up reform, this book assesses the relative merits of various debt-restructuring proposals, especially in relation to the main deficiencies of the current nonsystem. With contributions by leading academics and practitioners, the volume reflects the overwhelming consensus among specialists on the need to find workable solutions.

Although banking and sovereign debt crises are not unusual, the crisis that has unfolded across the world since 2007 has been unique in both its scale and scope. It has also been unusual in being both triggered by, and mainly affecting, developed economies. Starting with the US subprime mortgage crisis, and the recession in 2007-2009, the problem soon erupted into financial crisis in Europe. A few of these countries came to the brink of bankruptcy, and were rescued by the EU and the IMF on the condition they adopt austerity measures. The detrimental social effects of the crisis in both the US and Europe are still emerging.

Although there have been several studies published on the US crisis in particular, there has so far been an absence of an accessible comparative overview of both crises. This insightful text aims to fill this gap, offering a critical overview of causes, policy responses, effects and future implications. Starting with the historical context and mutation of the crisis, the book explores the policies, regulations, and governance reforms that have been implemented to cope with the US subprime mortgage crises. A parallel analysis considers the causes of the European sovereign debt crisis and the responses of the European Union (EU), examining why the EU is as yet unable to resolve the crisis. This book is supported with eResources that include essay questions and class discussion questions in order to assist students in their understanding.

This uniquely comprehensive and readable overview will be of interest and relevance to those studying financial crises, financial governance, international economics and international political economy.

Although banking and sovereign debt crises are not unusual, the crisis that has unfolded across the world since 2007 has been unique in both its scale and scope. It has also been unusual in being both triggered by, and mainly affecting, developed economies. Starting with the US subprime mortgage crisis, and the recession in 2007-2009, the problem soon erupted into financial crisis in Europe. A few of these countries came to the brink of bankruptcy, and were rescued by the EU and the IMF on the condition they adopt austerity measures. The detrimental social effects of the crisis in both the US and Europe are still emerging.

Although there have been several studies published on the US crisis in particular, there has so far been an absence of an accessible comparative overview of both crises. This insightful text aims to fill this gap, offering a critical overview of causes, policy responses, effects and future implications. Starting with the historical context and mutation of the crisis, the book explores the policies, regulations, and governance reforms that have been implemented to cope with the US subprime mortgage crises. A parallel analysis considers the causes of the European sovereign debt crisis and the responses of the European Union (EU), examining why the EU is as yet unable to resolve the crisis. This book is supported with eResources that include essay questions and class discussion questions in order to assist students in their understanding.

This uniquely comprehensive and readable overview will be of interest and relevance to those studying financial crises, financial governance, international economics and international political economy.

Europe is suffering from a bipolar economic disorder; one symptom of which is a sovereign debt crisis. The media have divided the continent into two groups of nations: center and periphery, not by geography but by credit ratings on national debt. European Debt Crisis: The Sovereign Debt Crisis – A Memorandum from the Periphery is a critical investigation of the root causes of the crisis, and the often misguided policy choices made to ‘resolve’ it.

Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz addresses how regional debt contagion in Europe compares with regional financial crises elsewhere, while former Argentine Minister for Economics Roberto Lavagna provides a poignant comparative analysis with his own country’s experience. Crucially and uniquely, Portuguese, Greek, and Irish economists provide hard-hitting case studies that offer the perspective of the European ‘periphery’.

A much-needed book offering a heterodox economic perspective on the causes, symptoms, and solutions of the biggest economic issue currently facing Europe.

Sovereign debt is a complex and highly topical area of law and this work represents a new main reference book on the subject bringing together contributions from world leading practitioners, scholars and regulators.

Divided into five parts the book opens with a part on restructuring which analyses contractual provisions and the role of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. The second part, on enforcement, considers the position of a sovereign as a defendant analyzing the availability of special immunities and matters of defense and arbitration pertinent to sovereign debt.

Part three of the book is concerned with complicating factors such as economic, political or banking crises and how these relate and complicate the task of addressing an unsustainable sovereign debt stock. In this section the particular and topical issues concerned with restructuring in a monetary union are explained.

The fourth part provides economists’ explanations of why and how sovereigns borrow and the causes of a sovereign debt, which enriches understanding by providing context to the purely legal aspects of the work. The book closes with a section which covers proposed reform to sovereign debt systems.

Dedicated to the leading expert Lee Buchheit, this work contains comprehensive and rigorous analysis on sovereign debt management which no specialist should be without.

Conventional wisdom holds that all nations must repay debt. Regardless of the legitimacy of the regime that signs the contract, a country that fails to honor its loan obligations damages its reputation, inviting still greater problems down the road. Yet difficult dilemmas arise from this assumption. Should today’s South Africa be responsible for apartheid-era debt? Is it reasonable to tether postwar Iraq with Saddam Hussein’s excesses?

Rethinking Sovereign Debt is a probing historical analysis of how sovereign debt continuity–the rule that nations should repay loans even after a major regime change, or expect reputational consequences–became the consensus approach. Odette Lienau contends that the practice is not essential for functioning international capital markets, and demonstrates how it relies on ideas of absolutist government that have come under fire over the last century. Challenging previous accounts, Lienau incorporates a wealth of original research to argue that Soviet Russia’s repudiation of Tsarist debt and Great Britain’s 1923 arbitration with Costa Rica hint at the feasibility of selective debt cancellation. She traces the notion of debt continuity from the post-World War I era to the present, emphasizing the role of government officials, the World Bank, and private-market actors in shaping our existing framework.

Lienau calls on scholars and policymakers to recognize political choice and historical precedent in sovereign debt and reputation, in order to move beyond an impasse when a government is overthrown.

In 2001, Greece saw its application for membership into the Eurozone accepted, and the country sat down to the greatest free lunch in economic history. However, the coming years of global economic prosperity would lead to unrestrained spending, cheap borrowing, and a failure to implement financial reform, leaving the country massively exposed to a financial crisis—which duly struck.

In Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis, Bloomberg columnist Matthew Lynn explores Greece’s spectacular rise and fall from grace and the global repercussions of its financial disaster. Page by page, he provides a thrilling account of the Greek financial crisis, drawing out its origins, how it escalated, and its implications for a fragile global economy. Along the way, Lynn looks at how the Greek contagion has spread like wildfire throughout Europe and explores how government ineptitude as well as financial speculators compounded the problem.

Blending financial history, politics, and current affairs, Lynn skillfully tells the story of how one nation rode the wave of economic prosperity and brought a continent, a currency, and, potentially, the global financial system to its knees. Lively, engaging, and thought provoking, Bust reminds us just how interconnected the world really is.

Q&A with Author Matthew Lynn
Author Matthew Lynn Bust looks at how the sovereign debt crisis started in Greece, but why did it start there?
Greece was one of the most profligate nations in the world. It has been virtually continually in default on its debts in one form or another ever since the modern Greek state was created in the nineteenth century. So it was always a fairly good candidate.

At the start of 2010, the markets were already getting worried about sovereign debt. It was essentially Act II of the credit crunch. Governments all around the world had fixed a private debt crisis by turning it into a public debt crisis: they ran up these huge deficits, both to bail out their banking systems and to boost their economies. But the public debts were never any more sustainable than the private debts.

Greece happened to be the easiest country to make an example of. But if it hadn’t been Greece, it would have been someone else.

This was really a crisis about the markets refusing to sanction unending government deficits – and that’s what the book explores.

But the book implies this is a story about the euro as well? Why is that?
It certainly is. The sovereign debt crisis blew apart the euro, and it is going to be very hard to put it back together. Europe’s single currency celebrated its first decade of existence in pretty good shape. The currency was stable, new members were joining, and it was gaining ground on the dollar as the world’s most important currency.

But then the Greeks came along and put a bomb underneath it.

Greece lied and cheated its way into the euro. It completely made up the figures that squeezed it into the euro, and, once it was inside, made no attempt to play by the rules. When confidence in the country collapsed, they expected the rest of Europe to bail them out. But what kind of club is it where you can cheat your way in, ignore the rules, then expect the other members to pick up your bar bills? Not one that anyone is going to want to belong to for long.

So this is not just a story about the sovereign debt crisis – it is a story about how the euro is falling apart, and how that will change the European Union as well.

What did you learn from writing the book?
The book was a real education for me. That was one of the reasons I wrote it. I wanted to learn more about how this fairly small country right on the edge of Europe which no one usually paid very much attention to was suddenly right at the epicentre of a major financial crisis.

It’s not the kind of story you can make sense of just by reading a few headlines. There were so many strands that had to be pulled together. The history of Greece, and why its economy was so underdeveloped. The design of the euro, and all the compromises that led up to its creation that proved to be crippling once the crisis struck. The changing nature of Germany, how it had overcome post-war guilt, and why it was refusing to bail-out the rest of Europe any more. The build-up of government debt right around the word. All of these big themes came together to produce this crisis, and that is what made it such a fascinating book to write.

What are the implications for the world economy of the themes you explore in the book?
Firstly, it’s the end of the euro, at least in its current form. It was a disaster to bail-out Greece, and, curiously enough, I think a lot of the people right at the very top of the policy-making debate knew that. It created a single currency with all the wrong incentives. It would have been far better to let Greece go bust and then to deal with the consequences of that than to try and patch up a broken system. But, in the end, and this process is detailed in the book, they shied away from that, and just threw money at the problem instead.

But it’s not going to work, and the euro is going to slowly unravel as a result. It might be three years, maybe five, maybe ten. But it going to happen, and it is going to be very messy.

But it is also the end of state profligacy, at least in the developed world. For about thirty years, governments have been consistently spending more than they raise in taxes. It’s a very easy option – spending money is a lot more popular than raising taxes. They did it by just continually adding to the debt.

In that respect, the politicians just reflected their electorates. Much the same thing happened in the private sector. In Europe and the U.S., ordinary people didn’t get much wealthier in the last thirty years, they just took on more and more debt.

But this crisis represents the end of that road. You can’t just keep on piling on more and more debt. As the title puts it, the system is bust. And the road is going to be much harder from now on.

How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment.

Tomz’s theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolves as debtors become more seasoned, and how countries ascend and descend the reputational ladder by acting contrary to investors’ expectations. Tomz systematically tests his theory and the leading alternatives across three centuries of financial history. His remarkable data, gathered from archives in nine countries, cover all sovereign borrowers. He deftly combines statistical methods, case studies, and content analysis to scrutinize theories from as many angles as possible.

Tomz finds strong support for his reputational theory while challenging prevailing views about sovereign debt. His pathbreaking study shows that, across the centuries, reputations have guided lending and repayment in consistent ways. Moreover, Tomz uncovers surprisingly little evidence of punitive enforcement strategies. Creditors have not compelled borrowers to repay by threatening military retaliation, imposing trade sanctions, or colluding to deprive defaulters of future loans. He concludes by highlighting the implications of his reputational logic for areas beyond sovereign debt, further advancing our understanding of the puzzle of cooperation under anarchy.

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